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Article 6 (3) of the Southern African Development Community's Mutual Defence Pact: The position of South Africa's peace diplomacy

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Abstract

The emergence of Southern African Development Community (SADC) as an institutional structure was a function of political construction and a reaction against the apartheid system in South Africa. Regulating and strengthening of security relations through effective structures for defence, peace, security, stability, and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives are some of the factors that stir the formation of SADC's Mutual Defence Pact. However, this work identifies its article 6 (3) as a leverage for member states to pursue a unilateral diplomatic agenda owing to its wordings. Hence, an opportunity for South Africa to explore this gap to pursue its own diplomatic agenda in the region. Using thematic content analysis, this paper argued that the provision in article 6 (3) takes down the effectiveness and credibility of SADC's MDP and conclude that although, the signing of the SADC's MDP is a development and a product of history, but it needs intensive deliberations and agreements on its 6th article.

Keywords: Peace diplomacy, Apartheid, Security architecture, Development, Agenda

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INTRODUCTION

Within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and by extension Africa, the promotion of peace, development and the improvements of livelihoods is believed to be the prerequisite for ensuring peace and order (Murithi, 2013). Debatably, Southern African region has remained the most stable region in Africa; although not immune to peace and security challenges. Deprivation of rights, insurgency, democratic crises and some sorts of governance deficits are some of the burning socio-political issues that have contributed to insecurity in the region. Following the achievement of inclusive democratic governance in 1994, South Africa has considered Southern Africa as one of its foreign relations hot spot and foremost to its foreign relations priority. Hence its commitment to the socio-economic and political well-being agenda of SADC.

Founded in 1992, as a regional governmental organization, the SADC seeks to promote collaboration, defence, economic integration as well as technical cooperation amongst member states. The most important legal documents guiding SADC's role in peace and security according to Lins de Albuquerque & Wiklund (2015) are the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and the Mutual Defence Pact. The membership of the community is made up of Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe and Madagascar.

The Southern African region emerged as a formal and institutional structure, primarily a function of political construction, and a reaction against the former apartheid regime in South Africa. The region was formed against the backdrop of apartheid South Africa and Cold War tensions that sometimes played themselves out in Southern Africa. Thus making the political environment in Southern Africa fraught apparently with security tensions (Qobo, 2007).

South Africa has stood out as a regional power on the basis of its geographic location, its relative robust economy, its presence in international forums, and a commitment to peacekeeping operations within and outside the region. However, the contemporary pursuit of making Southern Africa as its foreign relations hot spot and foremost its foreign relations is considered as a function of its regional hegemony; hence the statement that, what is good for South Africa is also good for the SADC.

Debatably, almost all members of the SADC had at one time or the other experienced a number of [socio-economic and political] conflicts, security and uncertainty environment of the region. It is against this background that Maeresera & Okeke Uzodike (2010) argued for an evolving SADC security architecture in Southern Africa; an inter-state [sub-regional] institutional initiative efforts made in the context of conflict situations in the region and launched to create a viable and common security arrangement through the establishment of protocols and pacts.

Madakufamba (2003) state that with the support of the Strategic Indicative Plan of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security Committee (OPDSC). The SADC Mutual Defence Pact is aimed at providing a framework for further cooperation on matters pertaining to economic, politics, defence as well as security at regional level. Fundamentally, and very significant is the fact that the desire of SADC member states to have a robust defence cooperation is hampered by numerous challenges. These includes, poverty, political instability, inequality in terms of economic development, lack of commitment and political will by some member states which have so far slowed down the operations of the MDP.

What this translates to mean is that, member states may not face a common enemy as well as not sharing the same perception of what their national interest entails. Thus, a member state can only employ the use of force while assisting another country only if such an action is in accordance with the protection of its [vital] security interests at the time the action is taken (Dinstein, 2005). For policy makers as well as experts in International Relations, the concept of peace diplomacy has remained fluid and seems to encompass the use of mediation, peace support operations, and post-conflict reconstruction, generically thus, questioning what exactly South Africa's interpretation of article 6 (3) of SADC's MDP is.

Apart from this introduction, this work is presented in eight main sections with the first focusing on the method employed, followed by research questions. This is followed by the theoretical framework/review of literature, followed by explanation of defence pact as mechanisms for collective security. The following section looked at the problems associated with the Southern Africa MDP and followed by the exploration of how South Africa has been able to utilise Article 6 (3) of SADC's Mutual Defence Pacts to its advantage and finally suggestion and conclusion.

METHODOLOGY

For the reason that the scholarship of diplomacy is very extensive and diverse, this work use thematic content analysis and critical discourse approach to assess article 6 (3) of SADC's Mutual Defence Pact vis-à-vis South Africa's interpretation and usage of the article in its foreign policy agenda.

Research questions

This study questions the understanding of SADC's Mutual Defence Pact, with particular reference to its Article 6 (3) and South Africa's response to this Article vis-à-vis its national interest? These questions enabled the researcher to reflect on the commitment of South Africa to the provision of the SADC's Mutual Defence Pact.

Theoretical framework/Review of literature

Scholars of IR has continued to use grand strategy theory while explaining phenomena in diplomacy. Silove (2018) comments that grand strategy theory can be compared to lodestone that naturally attracts other elements in diplomatic cycles. Meaning that it can adapt to any diplomatic environment. Grand strategy is a theoretical roadmap that conceives diplomatic actions that could possibly improve the existing diplomatic relations between states while projecting a sought after peaceful future (Layton 2018). Hence, King's (2016) submission that grand strategy can be understood as a detailed and conceived strategy by state actors, wilfully held and used while guiding their diplomatic behaviours.

Grand strategy involves state's combining [diplomatic and non-diplomatic] resources needed for execution and allocated to the subordinate strategies where each instrument of national power is diplomatically activated in accordance with all-encompassing diplomatic principles once developed (Layton 2018). Grand strategy is concerned with the state's most important diplomatic priorities, which include all spheres of statecraft such as diplomacy, economic, and military power taking into account both the instruments of power and the internal policies that are necessary for their implementation and, including consideration of periods of peacetime in addition to wartimes. Thus, grand strategy in IR is a means to an end, where states use every diplomatic means to improve their relations with one another, while purposefully shaping and applying the instruments of national power, diplomacy, military, and economic measures. Hence, the level at which a systemic and unit-level factors congregate, where matters of national [and regional] security within SADC are facilitated through diplomacy can be couched as the level of grand strategy.

Diplomatically, things do go wrong sometimes, thus making people to talk about diplomatic failure (Sharp, 2009:1-2). Also when there is a difficult socio-economic and political cum foreign relations to be [diplomatically settled] by states, a better diplomatic option is often called for. Therefore, the demand for diplomacy in settling diplomatic issues is considered to be the best option, hence, a way in which states talk to and negotiate with one another without going into war. Thus, diplomacy acquires the character of a magical balm-like *political will* which, when applied correctly to a [diplomatic] problem in sufficient quantities, will in some mysterious way get things moving and make things right. Therefore, diplomacy is considered to be the established method of influencing the decisions and behaviour of state and non-state actors through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures without resulting to violence (Marks, n.d). Incontrovertibly, diplomacy is meant to strengthen the state, nation, or organization it serves vis-à-vis others by advancing the interests in its charge. Hence, its ability to maximize a group's advantages without the risk of using force and without causing resentment. Diplomacy strives to preserve peace, and

strongly inclined toward negotiation to achieve agreements and resolve issues between states and or between state and non-state actors.

Discussing the subject or the idea of peace itself Miloš Vec (nd) ask the following questions; is peace simply the absence of violence between states? To what extent is peace a value in itself and must one at times forfeit something in return for peace? How far do we go in the name of peace? Can our peace mean war for others? By interpretation, peace, itself remains a contested concept.

According to International Peace Institute (2017:3) the concept of peace is multidimensional and multi-sectoral; this is because it cuts across different levels of human organization, thus rendering sustaining peace a highly collaborative task that requires strong leadership at national, international, and regional ownership of a diplomatic process that is inclusive of all key stakeholders, including the non-state actors as cornerstone to building successful and sustainable peace. Unlike law and security, it is a bit challenging to enforce peace from the top, it thus means that it must be woven into society through dialogue among state and non-state actors. Therefore, in any reasonable diplomatic relation, diplomacy should not be seen as the invention of some particular political system, but as an essential element to obtaining peace (Harold, 1977).

Peace diplomacy therefore, entails countries helping and supporting each other within the framework of international law. States could cooperate in areas such as the economy, communications, culture, science and technology as well. Peace diplomacy as a concept in itself has the connotation of preventing [internal and external] conflicts, which entails the prevention of conflicts within states, and between states. Peace diplomacy represent a state's interests and conducting negotiations (a key component in diplomacy), premeditated to identify common interests and areas of disagreement for the purpose of achieving the state's goals while avoiding conflict. Peace diplomacy also involves information gathering, and evaluation of the receiving state's foreign policy goals. In addition, Peace diplomacy is a means of expanding the socio-political, economic as well as culture among states. In the observation of international laws and conventions peace diplomacy can be considered as the diplomatic facilitator.

Arguably, peace diplomacy is the principal substitute for the use of force in statesmanship; it is a means of utilising national power to achieve peaceful alteration of diplomatic differences between states. According to Pressello (2021), in the fight in Cambodia between government troops and Vietnamese communist forces in 1970, Japan actively engaged diplomacy while trying to restore peace, Japan diplomatically launched several initiatives [although there is limited understanding of Tokyo's rationale for taking action in what was essentially a new area of Japanese peace diplomacy; international dispute resolution in the context of a multilateral diplomatic

effort] for a return to peace in Cambodia, by participating in an international conference to settle the conflict. Nobori (2007) convincingly argues for Tokyo's active participation in the Jakarta conference, that the changes in United States policy to reduce its military involvement in Asia in the late 1960s was the only diplomatic space needed by Japan to realise its aspiration to play a more active and political role in Southeast Asia, as well as to achieve a more autonomous diplomacy that is separate from U.S. Cold War strategy. Therefore, in the process of peace-making, diplomacy, has continued to have the last word.

From the early stages of the democratic peace research programme according to Steiner (2004), theories of diplomacy have been developed around bargaining over interstate disputes and makes two distinctions; peace diplomacy as independent variable and as dependent variable. As dependent variable, it takes into account rising constraints upon diplomatic statecraft, such as public opinion, ideology, and the intrusion of specialised actors. Nicolson in William (1994) had argued that as dependent variable, peace diplomacy correspondingly, focuses on the degree to which diplomatic practice adapts to the aforementioned constraints and hence incorporating the potential of diplomats and their governments to adapt to a set of policy dictates, military and economic changes that often affect the fate of state's diplomatic initiatives.

As independent variables peace diplomacy come into play when legates advance for unbiased dispute resolution in opposition to diplomatic moves that increase the chances of hostilities. South Africa has always been an advocate of peaceful resolution of conflicts within SADC and by extension the continent of Africa. This diplomatic quality has earned South Africa an enviable position within the committee of nations. Further to this, when the [economic, security] interests of a state cannot be fully resolved vis-à-vis the interests of other states, diplomacy becomes the immediate tool. This is the level where a robust and an unequivocal peace diplomacy is considered very essential while diplomatically revealing the areas where agreement is needful to avoid hostilities.

The international system, by default is anarchic and insecure where the weak states are considered the 'pawn' on the chess board of the stronger states. Mello (2016) argued that [democratic] states externalizes their domestic norms when interacting with fellow democratic states and where there is a degree of reciprocity. However, when engaging with non-democracies, they adapt to the norms of the latter while avoiding exploitation or threat by predatory regimes. The externalization of domestic norms implies that generally, democracies shouldn't be prone to hostilities as it would be in a non-democratic states rather democracies should only be involved in armed conflict when they are being attacked. Thus, democratic states are perceived as trustworthy and the level of predictability of what they can do is very high when they

are governed by the majority. This is the state of relations amongst states that constitute SADC, given their level of trust, hence the formation of SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003. Maeresera & Okeke Uzodike (2010) posits that the SADC's MDP is a sub-regional inter-state institutional effort that was launched in the context of conflict situations in the region as a collaborative security arrangement through the establishment of protocols and pacts.

Defence pacts as mechanisms for collective security and collective defence

Southern Africa is a region of great contrasts, aside the fact that the level of human development in the region is to some extent higher than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Evidently, the level of income inequality within southern African states is among the highest in the world (Lins de Albuquerque & Wiklund, 2015). Further to this, the majority of the current ruling parties cum liberation organisations in Southern African were directly involved in the struggle for liberation. Notwithstanding their cultural, language and ethnic differences, Southern Africa region shared the common history of being the last region to decolonise and liberate itself on the continent (Desmidt, 2017, Lins de Albuquerque and Wiklund, 2015).

Fundamental to the establishment of regional cooperation in Southern Africa is peace and security. The common approach to and sense of brotherhood among SADC member states to fight for independence as well as common opposition to apartheid has in many ways defines the nature of regional security cooperation. Therefore, SADC is a regional organisation with a mission to resist destabilisation and reduce dependency on the West. Notwithstanding, SADC lately has faced acute socio-security and economic challenges characterised by tensions between member states as well as maritime security and piracy, cyber and technology-driven security threats, social discontent, armed insurgency [in Mozambique, originating from the wider socio-political and economic disparity which has kept the country smouldering since 2017 where close to 2,000 people have been killed and tens of thousands displaced] and limited internal and external coordination, hence the need for regional security cooperation.

Omoigui (1999) defines defence pact as a formal agreement between states while enhancing the defence as well as the security capabilities of states that forms part of the signatories. Generally, defence pact can range from a non-aggression pact to a broader cooperation on security treaty to detailed military commitment for shared defence against any external belligerence or to protect the independence of member states, their territorial integrity as well as their strategic defence interests. Essentially, defence pact is usually limited to a specific time or number of years. It is subject to renewal of which its *wordings* may be specifically targeted at the defence against specific aggressor or whether or not such aggressor of the member states in question are internal with or without external backing which varies from pact to pact.

A non-aggression pact is a treaty between two or more states that includes an undertaking by the signatories that none of them would engage in military action against each other. This is otherwise known as a treaty of friendship or non-belligerency (Krause & Singer, 2001). Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, & Long (2002) however, distinguish between a non-aggression pact and a neutrality pact. They advance that a non-aggression pact takes account of the promise made by states not to attack the other pact signatories, whereas a neutrality pact includes a promise to avoid [at all cost] support of any entity/state that acts or plan to act against the interests of any of the signatories to the pact.

When discussing the subject of defence pacts, Maeresera & Okeke Uzodike, (2010), Omoigui (1999), argued that scholars often use collective security and collective defence interchangeably. Collective security they argued is used in the context of global or regional security relations. Collective security allows for both peaceful resolution of conflicts and the use of military force by states or groups of states (van Nieuwkerk, 2003:1). On the other hand, collective defence focuses on the collaboration of signatories to protect each other from external aggression and are not concerned with internal practices of signatories.

On collective self-defence, Article 52(1) of the UN Charter states that *nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purpose and Principles of the United Nations* (Charter of the United Nations, 2016). By interpretation one of the primary functions of this article is to make way for regions such as SADC; to have a common security approach against any endangerment of an armed attack originating from another region.

A common security approach according to Cawthra (2003) place emphasis on regional formation and sharing of common security concerns, often of a multidimensional nature, and together states can effectively and efficiently address their security needs than alone or in opposition to each other. Commenting on this, van Nieuwkerk (2003:1) states that mechanisms for security management cover not only relations between states but also such issues as democratic practice, human rights as well as civil-military relations. Among regional groupings such as SADC, the term “common security” has become a household term, although in practise the security cooperation within states in the region is better described as collaborative security, suggesting less systemic and comprehensive interaction, concludes van Nieuwkerk (2003).

It thus means that, mutual defence can be conceptualised in the context of common security or similar alliances. For this reason, Maeresera & Okeke Uzodike, (2010:96) argued that defence pacts do not exist in a vacuum but find relevance in and take on

the security situation of the environment under threat in which they exist. Further to this, if the threat to regional peace is not at the level that jeopardise the existing peace in the region, then not much in terms of the intensity of military operations other than war would likely be the focus of a defence relationship. This for example, was demonstrated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the post-Cold War era where the allied governments have the prerogative power to commit regional troops in supporting fellow member who is under an armed attack (Dinstein, 2005).

To make sense of this, a defence pact in itself cannot guarantee that any significant defence assistance will in reality be obtained when it is required by the benign member state. Primarily, the major advantage of being a signatory to such a pact may be located within political sphere of the pact where the pact is seen as a warning to the potential enemies of member states. Maeresera & Okeke Uzodike (2010) therefore, argued that the SADC mutual defence capability is only but a function of the sub regional political capacity as well as the sub region's international relationships, of which its full extent may not be fully appreciated unless the region take into consideration coexisting, economic, scientific, and cultural treaties.

Mutual Defence Pacts in Southern Africa

Some of the factors that stir the formation of SADC's Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) are regulating and strengthening of [security] relations through effective structures for defence, peace, security, stability and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. At its closing ceremony (26/08/2003), the assembly of Heads of State and Government the Southern African Development Community (SADC) signed the agreement establishing a mutual defence pact. The pact according to its chairperson, Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzanian President), will be a way to show commitment to, and application of, the concept of applying African solutions to African problems (van Nieuwkerk, 2003).

The essence of MDP is to regulate relations between states in the area of collective self-defence (van Nieuwkerk, 2003:1). Article 51 of the United Nations Charter of 1945, recognises individual or collective self-defence. Thus making individual [state's] right to self-defence open for operation in response to any form of armed attack (Charter of the United Nations, 2016). Reference to the idea of collective self-defence, it means that when a country experiences an armed attack, such a state can be supported by the signatories against the belligerent.

van Nieuwkerk (2003) had argued that there are several reasons for a country to come to the aid of another under attack. For example, armed attacks initiated anywhere against a state can be interpreted as an unswerving challenge to the mutual and vital interests of the states in the region. Apart from that they might equally act out of fear of a spill over of such attack or unintended effect or even who is next? Therefore,

believing that the danger of overwhelming force can only be forestalled when they are together against the aggressor.

The SADC Mutual Defence Pact was ratified by the SADC heads of state and government at its 2003 Summit in Tanzania, although the initial draft of the MDP was adopted in 2001. SADC's Mutual Defence Pact aimed at stabilising the region, cultivating an atmosphere conducive to investment and long term [socio-economic and political] stability while providing for a mechanism to prevent conflict between SADC countries, and with other countries, and for SADC member states to act together against any [external] aggression allowing for SADC intervention in intra-state conflicts which had the potential to affect the stability of the whole region (Ngoma, 2005, Neethling, 2003).

The SADC's MDP is closely related to a non-aggression treaty and regarded as a collective defence strategy, thus having the capability to prevent members from encouraging hostilities in each other's territory but can come to support member states in any eventuality of attack (van Aardt, 2009, 1997). In his contribution, van Nieuwkerk (2003) reiterate that mutual assistance treaties in this sense are instruments whereby signatories avow that an armed attack against one of them *will be regarded* as an armed attack against all the signatories, and thus vouchsafing to help each other in such circumstances.

Reference to the title of this work it is pertinent at this point to quickly look at some of the provisions of the Pact. Article 1 of the MDP provides salient explanations that overtly divulge the nature of the Pact. Amongst these is the fact that the pact continues to regard signatories as sovereign notwithstanding the declaration of a joint approach to security matters (SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 2003). Article 1(2) of the Pact defines an armed attack [against a member state] as the use of military force in violation of an independent state's sovereignty. Ngoma (2005) however, argued that the pact advocates for the protection of the state to the detriment of the lives of the citizens who are in the long run the motivating factor for a secure environment. Meaning that the safety and the security of the people in the region ultimately should come first and be guaranteed by the security of member states.

The above statement is a pointer to the inadequacy of the states going by article 1(2) of the Pact. Ngoma (2005) further reiterates that the definition of collective self-defence, which specifies the means for all states in the sub region to undertake measures to ensure peace, stability and security is a recognition of the vulnerability of the states in the region to security crisis. Therefore, the desire to act collectively is believe to be an admittance that the sovereignty of states in the region is susceptible to destabilisation.

In order to heighten an inclusive [political] stability in the region, article 3(1) of the pact makes provision for settlement of conflicts using the principles of the UN Charter, while article 3(2) entreat states in the sub region to avoid the threat or use of violence as a means of resolving conflicts. This is reinforced in article 5(1) and (2) which calls for consultation through the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) whose main function is to promote peace and security in the region; when a state is under threat from another State Party. The article further recommends 'joint verification mission' where such consultation does not yield peaceful and satisfactory resolution of the problem (SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 2003). By interpretation, for resolving conflicts between states a peaceful rather than a confrontational approach is emphasised in the sub region. It should however, be noted that states in the region must have signed different bilateral/multilateral diplomatic relations with countries in the SADC region as well as those from outside the region and thus may somewhat affect decision-making process in the region. Therefore, the pact may view decision (s) taken within the ambit of SADC as having effect on their national interests. In matters of defence and security the SADC member states are interlinked in articles 4, 6 and 9. These articles deals with military preparedness, collective self-defence and collective action, as well as defence cooperation.

Article 6 of the pact reads: *Collective Self-Defence and Collective Action. 1. An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action. 2. Collective action shall be mandated by Summit on the recommendation of the Organ. 3. Each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate. 4. Any such armed attack, and measures taken in response thereto, shall immediately be reported to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations*

Debatably, Article 6 though provides for collective self-defence and collective action to strengthen the relationships of states within the SADC and their interaction with other external organisational security structures. However, there is more to it vis-à-vis the actions of member states should there be any threat to member states from outside.

Article 6 (3) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact: wither South Africa's peace diplomacy

Years after the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) member states signed the MDP to promote regional cooperation in politics, defense and security, most states in the region are still been faced with some sort of socio-political, economic and most importantly security challenges. As stated above the pact agrees that member states can use force only as a last resort but must be authorized by the UN Security Council. The agreement, no doubts flows from the establishment of SADC's

Organ for Politics, Defense and Security. The intention of OPDS is to prevent conflicts as well as breakdown of law and order between and within SADC member states. It is the believe of SADC member states that the MDP will be a way of showing commitment to, and application of, the concept of African solutions to [SADC] problems.

However, from the statement credited to Aziz Goolam Pahad, former South African Deputy Foreign Minister (1999-2008), the SADC's MDP does not view an attack on one [member state] as an attack on all meaning that the SADC's MDP is not as binding as NATO's (The New Humanitarian, 2003). Article 6 (3) of the MDP states that "*each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate*" (SADC Mutual Defense Pact, 2003). By implication, member states can only respond to threat according to their possibilities. Therefore, should there be an external aggression against a member state, it means the whole process would have to be set in motion for SADC to take a decision whether such aggression merits a collective intervention and if not individual member state can according to their [economic or military] capability assist; reference to article 6(3) of the pact.

Sturman cited in The New Humanitarian (2003) states that primarily, the MDP focus on state security, [with] traditional military threats from outside. Hence the question whether such is the most suitable security cooperation needed by Southern Africa. It should however be noted that SADC member states; based on their individual foreign policy objectives, obviously will ultimately promotes their national interests. Meaning that, as an independent state; it is essential that states protect their national border, allies, areas of military importance (military supply routes, allies that host military base), prevention of foreign incursions into their national territory, maintenance of military power and capacity to project national security interests, promotion of economic investment abroad and at home, protecting the competitiveness of key domestic industries and maintaining economic power to ensure economic self-determination vis-à-vis other states' interests.

In other words, article 6 (3) of SADC's MDP is a leverage for member states to pursue the defence of their national interest even at the expense of the security of the region. Thus given South Africa the diplomatic grace to pursue a unilateral and diplomatic interest hiding behind the wordings of article 6 (3) of SADC's MDP. This might explain the dilemma of Pretoria whether to intervene and provide military assistance to Mozambique in order to fight terrorist's activities in the country.

South Africa since 1994 has not shy away from active engagement conflict resolution within SADC, Africa, and by extension on the global stage. Its transition to all-inclusive governance, largely driven by domestic actors has helped to reconcile the

former apartheid enclave with its divisive past, thus making its transition to democracy a model for other African countries.

Sidiropoulos (2007) writes that at the time South Africa entered the post-Cold War international landscape, the expectation from the international community about the role South Africa would and could play was very high. Over the years [after 1994] there has been tension between practicality and principles which has been the fundamentals of South Africa's foreign policy. Based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations South Africa can be regarded as increasingly driven by its foreign policy principles. South Africa's approach to a number of diplomatic issues has since changed, reflecting a growing appreciation of the importance of power and the impact that this can have on the foreign policy of a country, thus showing its experienced in the cut-and-thrust of international politics (Sidiropoulos, 2007:1).

Very important to post 1994 South Africa's foreign policy and in recognition of its location; is the recognition of Africa as the center piece of its foreign policy. Hence, recognizing the fact that its socio-economic and political success rest on the prosperities of Africa and that its relatively developed economy could play a leading role in Africa's socio-economic development (Sidiropoulos & Hughes, 2004).

Therefore, the provision in article 6 (3) that 'each State Party shall participate in such collective action in *'any manner'* it deems *'appropriate'* takes down the effectiveness and credibility of SADC's collaborative security arrangements via MDP. *Any manner* infers that SADC member states has the leverage to react to a crisis in the way they feel like, hence South Africa as the leading economy in the region can choose to spend and be spent in crisis that will benefits its economic development or ensure peace in country where it chooses to intervene with or without military action.

Nyuykonge & Zondi (2017:113) concurred with the above argument that South Africa has provided the following countries; Democratic Republic of Congo (the only member state of SADC), South Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR) Cote d'Ivoire with considerable assistance in the areas of good governance, security reform, dialogue and reconciliation, economic development, policy implementation, human resource and infrastructure development, trade and humanitarian assistance. What this imply is that South Africa's expertise and resources have been used in the development and support for peace processes in recipient countries. while fostering dialogue and reconciliation through financing negotiations, facilitating mediations, and channeling international buy-in of the process.

Good as it is that South Africa have invested in the security and peace of these countries; South Africa has also succeeded in setting up leading South Africa

businesses in these countries. For example, South Africa's technical assistance and skills training for Congolese to build a hydroelectric plant in the Bas Congo Corridor and facilitation of the business communication between the two countries has led to setting up of leading South Africa businesses in the country.

Landsberg (n.d.:2) had argued that in between the lines of South Africa's foreign policy agenda for Africa lies the understanding that [economic] development cannot take place without peace and stability. South Africa seems to understand this better than any of the SADC member state and hence its investment in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa. Further to this Lotze et al. (2015) concurred that South Africa's presence has always been felt in countries where it holds commercial interests. Following the successful negotiation of a peaceful election in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006, South Africa's mining companies, Standard Bank, the state-owned electricity provider Eskom and the mobile telecommunications giants, Vodacom and MTN, have all invested heavily in the country.

As an influential and pivotal actor in peace and security affairs South Africa has been lauded for evolving African peace and security architecture, where its mode of engagement ranged from mediation to peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction and development assistance (Mabera, 2016:77). Further to the interpretation of article 6 (3) of SADC's MDP, and given South Africa's position as a key developmental partner in Africa [and the global South], establishing a connection between sustainable development and peace and security within SADC has far-reaching policy implications for South Africa with particular focus on its role in SADC states through mediation, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction and development.

To van Nieuwkerk (2012) generally, most of South Africa's development interventions falls under the category of peace diplomacy as informed by its own history and the character of its foreign policy. Characteristically, South Africa's foreign policy is aimed at peace and stability cum development. Saferworld (2014) posits that peace and stability are mutually impacting concepts. They (peace and stability) are prerequisites for sustainable development. Therefore, in an attempt to 'export' this model of peace and stability to other African states and beyond, Pretoria has diplomatically position itself as Africa's preferred peacemaker, craft for itself the identity as champion of the African interests, emerging middle power, the diplomatic bridge builder between the global South and the global North (Beresford, 2013).

In line with its model of foreign policy, South Africa has engaged in peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction and development activities across the SADC and the continent in several countries including Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Comoros, Madagascar, Lesotho and has extended this to countries such as

Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d'Ivoire (in West Africa) and Ethiopia (in East Africa). This is a reflection of the overlaps of a human security agenda in South Africa's foreign policy apart from exploring the openness in article 6 (3) of the SADC's MDP to promote and project its image within and outside SADC.

Linked to the African peace agenda is South Africa's peace diplomacy, a core tenet of its foreign policy. This of course place emphasis on the interconnectedness of South Africa with the rest of the continent (Mabera, 2016:80). By interpretation, the development and stability of the continent is considered as a determinant of South Africa's economic development and security. Bohler-Muller (2012) had argued that while diplomatically advancing regional peace, integration and security, South Africa has position itself as a key to holding fort the peace, stability and development of the continent and championing the course of poor African states.

Although, regarded as an equal participant in many policy documents from the SADC, South Africa has the much stronger [military and economic] capabilities in practice, hence Odén's (2001) argument that the South African influence in the region will be stronger. This is in consonance with the fact that the capacity of regional institutions and regulatory frameworks will be directly or indirectly dependent on South Africa's support. Kornegay (2011: 43) advanced that within the context of Pretoria's engagement in conflict resolution and conflict management across Africa and with a well-protected logic of benign hegemony; peace diplomacy vis-à-vis African agenda can be taken as fundamental to normative dimensions of South Africa's developmental partnerships with states in the region.

In the words of Gvosdev, Blankshain, & Cooper (2019:3) foreign and national security policy are in many ways two sides of the same coin. They allude to the fact that it is imperative for states to protect its national security from [external] threats by utilizing the different tools of statecraft (military, economic, political etc.). Foreign policy encompasses all aspects of a state's relationships with external actors; external actors here refers not only, to the member of SADC but other states outside SADC and the rest of the world. The overlap between foreign and national security policy comes from the reality of the wordings of article 6 (3) of SADC's MDP thus South Africa's national security revolves around the utilization and projection of the instruments of its power into the international arena all in the effort of pursuing a foreign policy that take out or allays the fear of threat to the country while trying to get the most out of opportunities that comes its ways.

SUGGESTION AND CONCLUSIONS

The motive behind the signing of MDP by the SADC is to promote regional cooperation in socio-economic, political, most importantly defense and security. However, most member states are still being faced with some sort of socio-economic political, and security challenges. From the foregoing, Article 6 (3) of the MDP translates to mean that member states can [only] respond to such threat that merits a collective intervention from member states, if not individual member state can, but this is based on their [economic or military] capability to assist. It is therefore suggested that Article 6(3) of the pact be reworded as “member state shall be collectively responsible to defending any threatened member state in any manner it deems appropriate”. By implication it becomes mandatory to participate within their means while defending other member state.

Generally, regional security pact is aimed at making sure that signatories to such pact get together and develop a formal agreement regarding how they will defend each other. Security challenges have continued to increase across the globe and they are also diverse in nature, differentiated and sometimes bitty. Debatably, many of the security challenges being face by states today are overtly or covertly, generated within individual societies and are spread across borders to other states depending on the proximity of these states. Obviously, this has and will continue to aggravate the unhealthy and competitiveness of regional dynamics.

The evolution of SADC' MDP is to a large extent and in many respects, is a diplomatic cum security enterprise that is closely associated with the achievement of a higher level of cooperation among [SADC] states (Ngoma, 2004). Although, the SADC have a clear intention as a sub-regional group to have a pact that will unite the member state while defending and protecting their political sovereignty against any external incursion, however the diplomatic road to having a clear and key security pact that is fundamental to an all-encompassing security architecture is not clear. Hence, the statement that SADC's MDP is not as obligatory as NATO's because the MDP not view an attack on a member state as an attack on all.

South Africa as an emerging middle power, has since 1994 followed a pragmatic, reformist foreign policy agenda and for the reason that quantifiable conditions change so also decision-makers; South Africa's relationship with Africa vis-à-vis SADC therefore, evolved over time (van Nieuwkerk, 2014). Further to this, where the interests of South Africa overlap, it tends to produce a convergence of views on its national interest. Obviously, this cannot be assumed to be diplomatically static, but changes dynamically over time.

The confusion in SADC's MDP article 6(3) is related more to political will than security capability. Thus member states have so far exhibited a desire to preserve their right to manage their internal political and security process and only open up to SADC at their convenience. Therefore, the signing of the SADC's MDP is a development and a product of history that needs intensive deliberations and agreements on its 6th article as it plays down the importance of the pact. This is not to say that member states of SADC should not interact with states outside SADC but considering SADC's regional integration implementation, member states ought to take into account key deficits and gaps in the pact; bearing in mind the different political values among its member states around sensitive issues, such as national interest.

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